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ABSTRACT 
 
Abstract. The European Union (EU) has sought to lead the world in the adoption of 
ambitious climate change mitigation targets and policies. In an attempt to characterize and 
broadly explain the resulting pattern of EU climate governance, scholars have advanced the 
term “multi-level reinforcement.” This helps to account for the paradoxical situation whereby 
the EU seeks to lead by example but is itself a relatively leaderless system of governance. 
Drawing on a much fuller empirical account of the evolution of EU climate governance, this 
article finds that the term captures some but not all aspects of the EU‟s approach. It identifies 
four other paradoxical features of the EU‟s approach and assesses the extent to which they 
exhibit “multi-level reinforcement.” It concludes by looking forwards and examining the 
extent to which all five features are expected to enable and/or constrain the EU‟s ability to 
maintain a leading position. 
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CLIMATE CHANGE POLICY IN THE EUROPEAN UNION: 
UNDERSTANDING THE PARADOXES OF MULTI-LEVEL 
GOVERNING 
 
Introduction 
The European Union (EU) has a well known aspiration to lead the rest of the world in the 
governance of climate change. While the precise expressions and consequences of its “lead 
by example” approach have been widely discussed,1 not least in the period since the 2009 
Copenhagen summit,
2
 few doubt its desire (as distinct from its ability) to function as an 
“international agenda setter”3 in this policy area.4 In one of the most comprehensive article-
length accounts of the evolution of EU climate policy, Miranda Schreurs and Yves 
Tiberghien drew attention to the various ways in which the EU has sought to lead by 
example.
5
 Writing in the pages of this journal they documented how it has continually 
backed targets and goals that are more ambitious than those of other large emitters, such as 
its commitment to limit warming to 2 
°
C. Internally, it has adopted innovative policy 
instruments to attain these targets, chiefly the world‟s largest greenhouse gas emissions 
trading system (ETS), as well as a range of other policies and measures that go significantly 
beyond what some Member States had adopted at the domestic level.
6
 Prior to the 
Copenhagen conference, the EU adopted a complex package of climate and energy measures, 
which aimed, among others things, at: reducing greenhouse gas emissions by 20% from their 
1990 levels by 2020; centralizing and toughening the emissions trading system; and boosting 
                                                 
1
. Gupta and Grubb 2000; Oberthür and Roche Kelly 2008; Parker and Karlsson 2010; Wurzel and 
Connelly 2010. 
2
. Haug and Berkhout 2010. 
3
. Schreurs and Tiberghien 2007, 19. 
4
. Kelemen 2010. 
5
. Schreurs and Tiberghien 2007. 
6
. Schreurs and Tiberghien 2007, 25. 
 5 
the use of renewable energy.
7
 Had some of the other major emitters tabled similar packages 
at Copenhagen, the EU would probably have moved to a 30% reduction. 
One of the distinctive features of Schreurs and Tiberghien‟s analysis is that it aimed 
to offer a comprehensive account of EU climate governance. Whereas others focused on 
particular aspects of EU climate governance, such as its behavior in international 
negotiations,
8
 or particular policy instruments (such as emissions trading),
9
 they tried to stand 
back and comprehend the whole, in a way that echoed some of the initial accounts of EU 
climate policy.
10
 They were brave to do this because EU policy had expanded greatly since 
these first accounts were made. What, they asked, accounts for the overall pattern of 
governance in the EU? More specifically, what explains the “sustained pattern of policy 
innovation” it has achieved, particularly since the late 1990s?11 Despite some obvious 
“policy failures”―to which we can now add its inability to influence the deal brokered in 
Copenhagen―how and why does it continue “to be [an] international policy leader” in the 
area of climate change?
12
 
These are very big questions, to which Schreurs and Tiberghien offered one similarly 
encompassing explanation: a “dynamic process of competitive multi-level reinforcement 
among the different EU political poles within a context of decentralized [i.e. multi-level] 
governance” has continually pushed up standards and, by implication, the EU‟s role in 
setting them.
13
 This process has emerged in the slightly paradoxical situation in which the 
EU seeks to lead by example but is itself a relatively leaderless system of governance. Thus 
far this multi-level dynamic had, they contended, managed to overcome the many obstacles 
                                                 
7
. European Commission 2008.  
8
. van Schaik 2010. 
9
. Wettestad 2005. 
10
. Jachtenfuchs and Huber 1993; Skjærseth 1994; O‟Riordan and Jäger 1996. 
11
. Schreurs and Tiberghien 2007, 24. Interestingly, they do not define what they mean by policy 
innovation (i.e. in relation to what?). 
12
. Schreurs and Tiberghien 2007, 24. 
13
. Schreurs and Tiberghien 2007, 22. 
 6 
that at one time had frustrated policy change. These included inter alia: the multitude of 
actors and levels of governance; the EU‟s weak legal competences over key policy areas such 
as energy and taxation; and the perceived economic risks of moving quicker and further than 
other large emitters.
14
 In the mid to late 1990s EU climate policy began to take off. Changing 
constellations of national interests (specifically the desire of certain states to push the EU to a 
higher level of ambition),
15
 EU-level interests (the European Commission‟s desire to use 
climate policy as a means to deepen European political integration), and ideas (notably in 
relation to green growth or ecological modernization) were undoubtedly important enabling 
factors, but according to Schreurs and Tiberghien, what facilitated policy innovation was the 
EU‟s relatively open and pluralistic governance structure. This “enabled a dynamic of 
competitive leadership reinforcement to take place,” which endured for most of the 2000s.16 
This article starts from the same premise as Schreurs and Tiberghien―that there is a 
lot to be gained by considering EU climate governance in the round. It too “brackets off” 
international-level dynamics and influences and investigates what goes on inside the EU. 
Although external factors are of course hugely important (and are mentioned in the analysis 
below), sensibly Schreurs and Tiberghien opted to lay them to one side in the interest of 
parsimony.
 
However, in contrast to their analysis, this adds three additional features. First, it 
extends the timeframe by looking at the full sweep of time from the origins of the policy area 
in the late 1970s to the signing of the Copenhagen Accord in late 2009. Second, it looks 
across the increasingly interrelated challenges of mitigation and adaptation. And thirdly, it 
extends their thinking by distinguishing not one but five paradoxical features of EU climate 
governance. The Oxford English dictionary defines a paradox as something which is 
“apparently inconsistent with itself or with reason, though is in fact true.” The rest of this 
                                                 
14
. Schreurs and Tiberghien 2007, 21. 
15
. Kelemen 2010. 
16
. Schreurs and Tiberghien 2007, 26. 
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paper develops the notion of paradoxical features in an attempt to deepen our collective 
understanding of policy innovation in general and EU climate governance in particular. 
Having identified the main aims of this article, the remainder unfolds as follows. 
Section 2 provides a brief re-statement of Schreurs and Tiberghien‟s arguments. Section 3 
provides a brief description of the evolution of EU climate policy with a view to assessing 
how much can be accounted for in terms of continuous multi-level reinforcement. Section 4 
unpacks the five paradoxical features of EU climate governance and shows how they have 
played out in relation to policy development since the late 1970s. Section 5 looks forward, 
assessing how far they are likely to enable and/or constrain the future development of EU 
policy. Finally, Section 6 draws together some broad conclusions and identifies new research 
challenges. 
 
EU Climate Policy: A Case of Multi-level Reinforcement? 
The EU is not the only actor in international climate politics,
17
 but for several reasons 
Schreurs and Tiberghien were right to subject it to detailed analysis. First, the EU is 
interesting because it has adopted commitments that are much more ambitious than other 
large parties. Although not the largest emitter of greenhouse gases, it is nonetheless expected 
to have an important bearing on the world‟s efforts to avoid dangerous climate change. 
Second, its efforts offer governance theorists a range of insights into whether ambitious 
policies can be produced in multi-leveled political systems. Generally, the assumption is that 
the more levels (and hence veto points) there are, the more likely policies are to be blocked 
or watered down, thereby resulting in what EU scholars have termed “joint decision traps”18 
culminating in “policy gridlock.”19 At present, US climate policy at the federal level appears 
                                                 
17
. For a review of others, see Harrison and Sundstrom 2010. 
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. Peters 1997; Scharpf 2006. 
19
. Zito 2000. 
 8 
to be snared in just such a trap,
20
 whereas Schreurs and Tiberghien implied that the EU has 
not succumbed to this; on the contrary, its policies seem to have flourished. Finally, scholars 
of domestic politics in Europe are drawn to the EU because what happens at EU level can 
deeply affect national and local political life across Europe, through processes of emulation 
and, above all, Europeanization.
21
 
If there was an analytical core to Schreurs and Tiberghien‟s thoughtful and wide-
ranging argument, it was that the EU‟s structure―comprising non-state actors such as the 
European Parliament and the Commission; the constant sharing out of steering roles such as 
the Presidency; and numerous entry points for non-state actors―has more than compensated 
for the proliferation of potential veto points that could in theory have gridlocked policy. In 
order to move beyond thick description, they borrowed an insight from Zito, who argued that 
depending on circumstances (changing actor preferences for example), decision points need 
not necessarily be veto points―they can also be “leadership points.”22 Thus in the area of 
climate change, different actors operating at different levels of governance have become very 
adept at “passing the baton” of leadership from one to the other. 
Schreurs and Tiberghien‟s analysis serves to remind us of an important paradox that 
has always underlain the EU‟s approach to governing lots of things, not just climate change. 
While the EU as a whole regularly expresses a collective desire to lead, it remains a 
relatively leaderless system of governance,
23
 without a single point of governing (or 
“government”). This state of affairs did not arise by chance: by aiming for polycentric 
governance, the EU‟s „founding fathers‟ deliberately set out to prevent power from 
accumulating in ways that had dragged Europe into two world wars.
24
 Branches of 
governance theory tell us that in such settings, leadership (as well as policy coordination 
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. Selin and VanDeveer 2009. 
21
. Jordan and Liefferink 2004. 
22
. Schreurs and Tiberghien 2007, 25. 
23
. Sbragia 1993; Hayward 2008; Wurzel and Connelly 2010. 
24. What Hayward (2008, 2) refers to as “uninhibited leadership”. 
 9 
more broadly) is likely to be immensely challenging,
25
 although there may be associated 
benefits in terms of greater flexibility and responsiveness.
26
 Be that as it may, their main 
point still stands―leadership has been bountiful despite the (paradoxical) absence of a single 
point of governing. 
To be fair, Shreurs and Tiberghien‟s basic claim is not especially novel,27 but they 
were the first to abstract it from the general field of EU analysis and apply it to the issue of 
climate change. They did not root it in (or seek to test) particular theories of the EU, and they 
did not seek to systematically compare the level of policy innovation in the EU with that 
occurring in comparable multi-level settings such as the United States. Consequently, it 
remains a partial account. Indeed, they concentrated on only one paradoxical feature―the 
plentiful supply of leadership in a leaderless system of governance―when arguably there 
are, as will be made clear, several more. Importantly, this one feature was presented in a 
somewhat static and isolated fashion; they did not investigate the EU‟s ongoing response to 
them all. This omission could have arisen because policy-makers in the EU came to realize 
that they did not have to directly alter the first paradoxical situation, for example by 
systematically centralizing leadership functions.
28
 On the contrary, leaderlessness seemed to 
enable policy innovation. The remainder of this article seeks to refine and also greatly extend 
Schreurs and Tiberghien‟s thinking by investigating how the EU has responded not just to the 
one paradoxical feature, but also to four other, interlinked features. Rather than seeking to 
develop and/or test a specific theory of EU governance,
29
 the analysis proceeds at the same 
general level as theirs. 
 
                                                 
25
. Sbragia 2000. 
26
. Skelcher 2005, 89; Ostrom 2010. 
27
. See for example, Jordan 1999, Weale et al. 2000; Zito 2000; and Börzel 2005. 
28
. Schreurs and Tiberghien 2007. 
29
 Were such a thing even to exist. See Wiener and Diez 2009. 
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EU Climate Policy 
A Brief Historical Overview 
EU climate policy has been well over thirty years in the making. In the late 1970s, it was one 
small aspect of the EU‟s research policy. Its aim was to investigate the underlying scientific 
issues associated with climate change rather than exploring questions relating to its 
governance. It was not until some eight years later that the Commission issued a 
communication on climate change.
30
 Although climate change-related policies were starting 
to be put in place around this time (particularly at Member State level), their primary 
motivations were environmental and energy-related, not climate change. The only other EU 
institution to show any interest was the European Parliament, but it was far too weak to do 
any more than offer opinions. There was certainly little evidence of “multi-level 
reinforcement” before 1988. 
After 1988, this initial phase of agenda setting gave way to a period of more 
determined policy initiation, again dominated by Member States. In the Council, the desire 
for common emission reduction policies grew, particularly amongst greener states such as 
Denmark, the Netherlands and Germany. Although the EU played a significant part in 
securing the adoption of the 1992 Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC), 
its own policies remained largely symbolic in nature. So long as its “1990 by 2000” 
stabilization target could mostly be achieved through existing (i.e. national level) 
commitments, there was actually no need for EU-wide policies or burden sharing 
agreements. As the political mood at the national level changed (essentially favoring more 
national control and greater economic growth), the Commission had to watch as the Council 
systematically stripped its climate proposals of substantive content after 1992. Most notably, 
                                                 
30
. European Commission 1988. 
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its 1991 proposal for an EU-wide carbon/energy tax was blocked by the Council.
31
 Again, 
“multi-level reinforcement” fails to capture the slow and incremental manner in which EU 
level policies were accumulating during this period. 
That the various parts of the EU were able to summon any collective enthusiasm for 
the post-UNFCCC negotiations was largely due to the fact that greenhouse gas emissions 
were declining relative to their 1990 levels, albeit for entirely unrelated reasons (namely 
economic and market restructuring in Germany and the United Kingdom). These trends 
allowed the EU to remain united in terms of long-term goals (principally in the form of the 
two degree target, facilitated by an informal burden sharing agreement in 1996). It signed the 
Kyoto Protocol as a single bloc in late 1997. Yet, this masked a great deal of internal 
disagreement on many detailed matters; and crucially, Member States continued to operate 
on the basis of their own national targets and policies. Yet again, multi-level reinforcement 
was conspicuous by its absence. 
Nevertheless, the policy status quo had to change, because it was deemed insufficient 
to deliver the EU‟s newly adopted Kyoto target. As part of a package of measures to address 
rising emissions from the transport sector, a series of voluntary agreements were reached 
with car manufacturers. Other new EU-level policies were also adopted, but often in areas 
where the reduction of greenhouse gas emissions was a secondary consideration or a “co-
benefit” (e.g. the landfilling of waste). The EU mainly concentrated on what it was best at, 
namely agreeing technical standards covering traded products like washing machines and 
boilers. There was, in other words, a steady trend towards “multi-level reinforcement” but it 
hardly produced significant “policy innovation”, defined as policies that deviated 
significantly from the status quo. 
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Behind the scenes, though, the Commission opened up discussions with a wide array 
of stakeholders on more innovative policy options, in a forum known as the European 
Climate Change Programme. This proved to be an effective incubator for many of the policy 
proposals that emerged in the more active and dynamic period of EU policy-making covered 
by Schreurs and Tiberghien (essentially post c. 2000). In this period, many more of the 
Commission‟s proposals were adopted, driven along by more alarming scientific warnings 
from the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change and buoyed by a surge of public 
interest and leadership from politicians at the national level (such as Tony Blair). An 
important policy change around this time was the EU‟s sudden volte-face on emissions 
trading. This was partly driven by the perceived need to save the Kyoto Protocol following 
the US‟ withdrawal in 2001, and partly by the activities of policy entrepreneurs in the 
Commission who were pushing hard to extend the EU‟s tool box to include market-based 
instruments.
32
 The transformation in this period was all the more remarkable because it took 
place against the backdrop of the EU‟s largest ever enlargement in 2004, when it absorbed 
ten new and relatively poor states from Central and Eastern Europe, and a renewed focus on 
economic renewal, powerfully set out in the 2000 Lisbon Strategy.
33
 Leading on climate 
change also happened to fit nicely with the EU‟s wider geopolitical strategy, formalized in 
the 1993 Maastricht Treaty, of developing a more coherent foreign policy to project its 
“normative power” globally. It also allowed politicians in the EU to differentiate their 
position from the more unilateralist position adopted by the Bush administration.
34
 In all 
these respects, climate policy started to emerge as a handy political rationale for people like 
the Commission President Barroso to push for deeper European integration, especially after 
the demise, in 2005, of the EU‟s previous plan―a single European constitution.35 
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. van Asselt 2010. 
33
. Oberthür and Roche Kelly 2008, 12-13. 
34
. Schreurs and Tiberghien 2007, 41. 
35
. Benson and Jordan 2008. 
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Therefore, after twenty years of slow growth, EU climate policy eventually began to 
reinforce itself in the multi-level manner described by Schreurs and Tiberghien. After 2005, 
the EU focused its energies on complying with the Kyoto Protocol (lest failure undermine its 
claims to lead), developing internal policies for the period after 2012, and preparing the 
ground for what it hoped would be a successor agreement. The key internal policy 
development in this period was the adoption of the climate and energy package noted above. 
This highly complex combination of policies aimed to reduce emissions by 20% and boost 
the share of renewable energy to 20% by 2020.
36
 However, as EU leaders stepped up their 
rhetorical commitment to climate policy, so the political limits to continual multi-level 
reinforcement started to appear. For example, after the start of the credit crunch in 2007 
(which, incidentally, was when Schreurs and Tiberghien‟s analysis ended), extensive 
concessions had to be made, for example to secure the support of poorer EU states. In the run 
up to Copenhagen, while the more eager states pushed for an even higher (30%) target linked 
to offers of fast track financial assistance to induce developing country support, the poorer 
states adopted an increasingly more cautious line. According to some observers Copenhagen 
marked a political “watershed” in the EU‟s appetite for, and ability to adopt, ever stronger 
and more innovative climate policies.
37
 
 
Emerging Patterns of Climate Governance 
In comparison with the more straightforwardly environmental areas of EU policy,
38
 climate 
policy has therefore emerged in a much slower and more stepwise fashion than implied by 
Schreurs and Tiberghien. Indeed for very long periods of time, EU climate policy remained 
little more than an empty shell―some eye-catching common targets underpinned by a rough 
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. Haug and Berkhout 2010, 26. 
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amalgam of national policies. After c. 2000, however, things did change relatively quickly as 
multi-level reinforcement kicked in. In 2008, the European Environment Agency estimated 
that around 80% of the climate policies and measures implemented at Member State level 
were either introduced in response to EU policies or had been reinforced by them.
39
 But prior 
to 2000, it would be quite wrong to argue that there was a gradual, inexorable progress 
towards increasingly strong policies at EU level. 
In addition to policy development being more stepwise than Schreurs and Tiberghien 
originally suggested, EU climate policy is also much more variegated than the term “multi-
level reinforcement” would seem to allow for. It is variegated in the sense that it is heavily 
reliant on a small sub-set of policy instrument types (see Table 1). There has certainly been 
no steady accumulation (“reinforcement”) of all the types at EU level. In terms of the number 
of instruments used by type, the EU steadfastly remains a “regulatory state.”40 And although 
one single market-based instrument (emissions trading) now encompasses over 50% of total 
EU carbon dioxide emissions, even this comprises hierarchical elements. Moreover, most of 
the EU‟s regulatory instruments govern a relatively small subset of activities (i.e. the trade in 
energy-using products such as cars and white goods). For various reasons, voluntary 
agreements remain relatively under-utilized,
41
 while the Commission‟s one and only attempt 
to adopt EU-level taxes ran into concerted opposition. Thus, this “liberal” system of 
governance is left in the paradoxical situation of having to rely heavily on the “illiberal 
instrument” of regulation.42 
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. Majone 1994. 
41
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Table 1  
EU Climate Policy: Principal Policy Instruments 1992-2009.
43
 
Regulatory instruments
 
  1992 Monitoring CO2 emissions  
 2001 Electricity from renewable energy sources 
 2002 Energy performance of buildings 
 2003 Biofuels for transport  
 2004 Promotion of combined heat and power 
 2005 Ecodesign of energy using products 
 2006 Energy end use efficiency and energy services 
 2009 Climate and energy package (covering: effort sharing; emissions 
trading; renewable energy; carbon capture and storage). 
 2009 CO2 emissions from cars 
Market-based instruments  2003 Upper and lower limit for national fuel taxes 
 2003 Emissions trading (amended in 2004 and 2009) 
Informational instruments 
 
 1992 Energy labeling of appliances (+ daughter directives) 
 1992 Eco-label 
 1993 Eco-management and Audit Scheme 
Voluntary instruments  1998/1999 Car emissions (supplanted by 2009 Regulation―see above) 
 
If one turns to look at policy on adaptation to the effects of climate change―an aspect 
neglected by Schreurs and Tiberghien―there are still no dedicated measures with legislative 
force at EU level.
 44
 Attempts to locate and exploit synergies between mitigation and 
                                                 
43
. Based on Jordan 2011a; 2011b.  
44
. An asymmetry which is also apparent at the national level: by 2008, only seven Member States had 
adopted national adaptation strategies. See EEA, JRC and WHO 2008. 
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adaptation policies are still few and far between, even at the national level.
45
 In short there 
seems very little prospect of adaptation policy reinforcing in a multi-leveled manner. 
 
Multi-level Governing: From Paradox to Paradoxes 
So while the term “multi-level reinforcement” seems to have a general applicability, it does 
not account for the totality of EU governing. Some aspects (such as the ability to set targets 
and adopt certain kinds of regulatory instruments) have steadily accumulated at EU level, but 
others (for example, the ability to represent Member States in international discussions, to 
select from the full repertoire of policy instruments, or shape European adaptation policies) 
have not.  
Moreover, the quest for leadership in a governance system that is leaderless is only 
one of a number of paradoxical features of governing in the EU. On the basis of the 
foregoing discussion, there appear to be at least four others: 
 External “actorness” and internal diversity. Although the EU seeks to participate and 
remain fully united in international level discussions, it constantly struggles to act in a 
united manner because Member States persistently value their sovereign 
independence, particularly when important governing choices have to be made and 
the stakes in international negotiations are high.
46
 
 Policy harmonization and differentiated burden sharing. While it is true that different 
parts of the EU have pursued an increasingly common policy approach both 
externally (i.e. collective targets) and internally (common, EU-level policies), it 
routinely falls back on differentiated forms of internal governance, typified by the 
practice of internal “burden-sharing.” 
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 Ambitious targets but constrained policy instrument choices. Although the EU has 
adopted relatively ambitious policy targets it relies heavily on a narrow sub-set of 
policy modes and instruments (chiefly regulation) to achieve them.
47
 
 Escalating ambition but constrained implementation capacities. The EU exhibits a 
well-known mismatch between ambitious policy intentions and weak implementing 
capacities.
48
 
The next section investigates how the EU has responded to all five paradoxes, both singly 
and in combination, starting with the one originally identified by Schreurs and Tiberghien. 
 
The Paradoxes of Multi-level Governing 
Leadership and Leaderlessness 
In the EU, leadership has two sides.
49
 On the one hand, some actors (principally the 
Commission, the Parliament and the greener states) have tried to shape common EU-level 
policies by taking the lead. On the other hand, the EU as a whole has a long-standing 
ambition to play a leading role as a “global actor” in international politics.50 Yet, without a 
central point of steering―both inward and outward―leadership has had to originate from 
many places at the same time, to avoid the kind of “policy gridlock” which is such a feature 
of US climate policy.
51
 In the first few phases of policy development, there were not enough 
leaders and too many laggards and EU policy struggled to advance, as evidenced by the 
failed carbon/energy tax proposal. But as domestic preferences in some Member States 
changed and the Commission as a whole started to view climate change in more positive 
terms, new leaders came to the fore. 
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The key analytical issue at stake here is not why these preferences changed,
52
 but how 
they fed through key decision points and affected EU-level policies; howthe absence of a 
single point of central leadership became an enabling rather than constraining factor. The 
answer lies in the fact that institutional structures that concentrate leadership are more prone 
to the vicissitudes of the issue-attention cycle.
53
 By contrast, when there are many actors 
working at many different levels, there is more likely to be a coalition with sufficient 
motivation (and opportunities) to drive the rest towards a higher level of ambition. 
The potentially liberating effect of distributed or polycentric governance is a 
significant feature of Schreurs and Tiberghien‟s argument.54 For instance, the emergence of 
emissions trading schemes at the international and national (the UK and Denmark) levels has 
influenced the development of the European system.
55
 Overall, therefore, this particular 
feature has not been nearly as constraining as some versions of governance theory would lead 
us to expect. For at least ten years, polycentricism has, as predicted by Ostrom,
56
 facilitated 
an escalation in policy ambition, even if the resulting policy outputs have been rather more 
variegated than Schreurs and Tiberghien originally claimed. For their argument to have 
general validity, there must have been “baton passing” not just on overall targets, but in 
particular sub-areas, targets and instruments of policy. Clearly, this is inconsistent with the 
evidence outlined above. 
 
External “Actorness” and Internal Diversity 
The EU tries very hard to be an internally united “actor” in its dealings with other actors.57 
Finding and holding to common positions gives it a sense of purpose and, it believes, greater 
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negotiating power, which in turn feeds through to more purposeful policy development 
internally. But during the early phases of climate policy it struggled to achieve this, spending 
a great deal of time “negotiating with itself.”58 One of the main reasons for this was that 
Member States were strongly of the view that they should determine the pace of internal 
policy development and that consequently climate change should remain an issue of “mixed 
competence.” In other words, they have never been willing to vest the Commission with the 
power to negotiate on their behalf in international discussions, and thus make the EU more 
“actor-like.” As such, there has been no systematic multi-level reinforcement in the EU‟s 
external negotiating powers.  
There is of course an important downside to this, which is that it leaves the EU at risk 
of dissolving into competing actors when the political heat is on, potentially imperiling the 
course of an entire international negotiation. In spite of all the various changes that have been 
made to reinforce the EU‟s actorness, the risk of internal division remains ever-present. 
Shortly after Copenhagen, Connie Hedegaard, who presided over that meeting before 
becoming the EU‟s first Climate Change Commissioner, claimed that: 
 
“[i]n the last hours, China, India, Russia, the US and Japan each spoke with one voice 
while Europe spoke with many different voices .... Sometimes we‟re almost unable to 
negotiate because we spend so much time talking to each other.”59  
 
The institutions of the EU have, however, taken a series of incremental steps to 
address this particular feature. The political shock of the failed Conference of the Parties at 
The Hague in 2000 (when large Member States openly worked against one another) forced 
them all to seek much greater actorness; the Commission was thus formally brought into the 
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“troika” arrangement (in which the Presidency of the Council works closely with the 
previous and future incumbents of that position). After 2004, further adjustments were made 
to create a system of “issue leaders” and “lead negotiators” through which national and 
Commission officials work together in mixed teams.
60
 Further changes are being made in the 
wake of the 2009 Lisbon Treaty.
61
 However, the Commission‟s attempts to represent the EU 
at all international meetings have been continually blocked by states.  
To conclude, the EU as a whole has taken active steps to address this particular 
paradoxical feature. These have had to be carefully (re)negotiated because they impinge on 
the states‟ sovereign power to negotiate independently in international affairs.62 But in doing 
so, the EU as a whole has realized that while actorness is politically challenging to attain, the 
benefits of internal diversity are not overwhelming either. To understand this, one need only 
look at a fully-fledged federation such as the United States, in which the federal government 
(i.e. the functional equivalent of the EU) defines the national “common” position, without 
having to negotiate so intensively with lower levels. Common positions (“actorness”) take 
time to reach in the EU, but when the EU eventually signs an international agreement, it 
delivers 27 signatures and―thus far in climate policy―an equivalent number of ratifications. 
By contrast, the United States must still overcome the ratification hurdle, as witnessed by the 
administration‟s continuing failure to secure the Congress‟ support for the Kyoto Protocol. In 
other words, “the very characteristic that makes the EU so problematic for traditional global 
negotiations―an uncertain, or mixed identity―becomes a strength when it comes to the 
ratification and implementation stages.”63 
 
Policy Harmonization and Differentiated Burden Sharing 
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The third paradox is strongly related to the previous one. The EU‟s overriding mission is to 
secure trade liberalization, which in part it does by promoting policy harmonization. One 
could even decode its preferred approach to international climate governance (binding 
“targets and timetables”) as a partially successful attempt to “upload” this approach to the 
UN level.
64
 But having fought for such an approach at the international level as well as 
special provisions for the EU to participate in UN treaties, the EU has continually adopted 
internal burden sharing agreements whereby each Member State is allocated a slightly 
different target. This is about something entirely different: differentiated governance.
65
 
Critics maintain that burden sharing is a rather hypocritical and self-indulgent 
exercise in internal governance, which has had to be painstakingly embedded in the legal 
architecture of the UNFCCC. But once a burden sharing agreement has been struck, it has 
arguably held the EU together more tightly than would otherwise have been the case, 
preventing long and potentially debilitating prisoners‟ dilemmas.66 Moreover, by acting 
together, Member States have arguably increased their bargaining power in international 
discussions. As noted above, the internal and external dimensions are in a sense two sides of 
one coin. 
To conclude, the EU has perceived this paradox to be potentially constraining of 
policy innovation and thus has sought to confront it. For example, it has revised the internal 
arrangements used to share the burden of collective emissions targets amongst Member 
States (whose number has grown from 9 in 1980 to 27 from 2005). Indeed, recent policies 
(e.g. the 2009 renewable energy Directive) go one step further in this respect by enshrining 
national-level targets to support a common EU-wide policy. Moreover, as more emissions are 
brought within the ambit of the emissions trading system, the whole approach to burden (or 
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“effort” as the Commission now prefers to term it) sharing,67 will gradually become more 
market-oriented and less open to inter-state bargaining. 
 
Ambitious Targets but Constrained Instrument Choices 
Schreurs and Tiberghien documented the EU‟s proven ability to adopt eye-catching targets,68 
but they overlooked the fact that its choice amongst the main policy instruments has always 
been rather more constrained than at national level. Given their inability to raise and spend 
large amounts of new money, EU climate policymakers have instead learnt to rely on 
regulation in order to govern, the costs of which are borne by Member States and private 
actors. However, policy theory
69
 reminds us that regulatory instruments tend to generate 
benefits that are diffuse but costs that are concentrated on particular actors; in other words, 
precisely the conditions in which target groups are likely to mobilize against policy-making. 
The EU has recognized and actively tried to confront this paradoxical feature by 
moving beyond regulation. There have, as we have noted, been some well-known failures 
(taxation for example, where the EU still cannot agree upon minimum levels of taxation for 
energy-saving products), but also some unexpected successes: the EU ETS represents a clear 
case of rapid policy innovation. Adaptation too is slowly emerging as a test-bed for softer, 
non-regulatory forms of governance such as policy mainstreaming.
70
 But in other respects, 
this paradoxical feature has turned out to be not quite as constraining as was originally 
feared. Unlike states (which are often tied up in the highly divisive politics of raising and 
spending public money), the reliance on regulation has arguably encouraged the EU to 
concentrate on what it does best―governing technocratically through a myriad of humdrum 
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regulatory decisions. Some claim it has even given the EU a basic “clarity of purpose,”71 
which has been highly liberating when problems are, like climate change, extremely 
wicked.
72
 
 
Escalating Ambition and Constrained Delivery Mechanisms 
The fifth paradoxical feature relates to the perceived mismatch between ambition and reality. 
The EU‟s inability to turn “lofty” ambitions into concrete change was not lost on Schreurs 
and Tiberghien,
73
 but its long term importance was rather glossed over. Problematic 
implementation is not simply an internal matter: critics seize on it to cast doubt on the EU‟s 
sincerity and capability as a credible negotiating partner. Until now, though, the EU has 
evaded the potentially constraining effect of this feature by adopting targets that were either 
effectively self-implementing or could be achieved at relatively low economic cost. Thus it 
easily met its initial stabilization target (emissions in fact fell 3.5%).
74
 The indications are 
that it will fulfil its Kyoto target (see below), but again only by relying heavily on “gratis” 
reductions made by the largest states,
75
 or via the flexibility mechanisms that it fiercely 
resisted when the US government initially proposed them in the UNFCCC process. 
Nonetheless, the failure in the past to achieve more specific targets in relation to the 
use of renewable energy sources or energy efficiency indicates the presence of underlying 
implementation problems that will not easily go away. To the extent that the issue has been 
confronted, it has been in a rather roundabout manner: the EU meets its policy targets but for 
reasons that are not directly to do with its policies. 
 
Multi-level Governing: Looking to the Future 
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Immediate Challenges 
Looking forwards, there are a number of immediate challenges which could well provide a 
much sterner test of the EU‟s ability to govern in a multi-reinforcing manner.76 In the short 
term, the most obvious (but easiest) challenge will be to ensure that it fulfills its Kyoto 
commitments. Until quite recently, there were grave fears that it would not. These were 
addressed by the wave of new policies that appeared post-2000. Any remaining doubts have 
again been greatly allayed by “non-policy” effects including the global recession and higher 
energy prices.
77
 
The second immediate challenge―delivering the 20% target by 2020―was also 
thought to present a serious test of the EU‟s governing ambitions. However, the European 
Environment Agency‟s most recent estimates suggested that the EU-27 is making such good 
progress that it may eventually reach the target with several years to spare.
78
 Nonetheless the 
EU remains very wary of proceeding to a unilateral cut of 30%. One reason is to secure 
bargaining power in international discussions, but another is the continuing fear that 
escalating policy ambition could be undermined by constrained implementation (the fifth 
paradoxical feature). Some Member States are already well on the way to meeting such a 
target are keen to take the risk, but others are not, lest it put their industries at greater risk of 
carbon leakage.
79
 More internal debates in relation to the simultaneous desire for policy 
harmonization and differentiated burden sharing (the third paradoxical feature) can thus be 
expected in the period to 2020. 
Interim targets beyond 2020 (but prior to 2050) are proving even more challenging to 
agree because much of the energy generation stock―power stations for example―which 
will be functioning in 2020 is effectively already in place. Emission pathways after 2020 are 
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thus more difficult to predict, in part because they relate to areas that hitherto have been 
relatively untouched by EU policy, particularly transport, which remains the fastest growing 
source of greenhouse gas emissions, and agriculture.
80
 These two policy areas go to the very 
heart of the European integration project. Agriculture is one of the oldest areas of EU policy-
making. And as an inherently trade liberalizing institution concerned with facilitating the 
mobility of people and goods, the EU has found it very hard to attenuate the rising demand 
for travel. In the meantime, much will depend on a single policy instrument―the EU 
ETS―and the dampening effect of the recession. Although the EU ETS has generated some 
emission reductions (the exact figures are contested),
81
 it will need to do a great deal more to 
decarbonize the EU. 
Then, of course, there is adaptation.
82
 Here, much rests on how well the EU can 
negotiate its way to a post-2013 budget that re-allocates resources away from investments 
and spending―particularly in agriculture and regional infrastructure―that increase 
vulnerability, towards new patterns that reduce it. Here, the politics are not as immediately 
amenable to the multi-level reinforcement dynamics described by Schreurs and Tiberghien. 
While the Commission, supported by the Parliament, may wish to see a progressive 
“greening” of the structural funds, this will require the agreement of a Council in which new 
Member States, keen to follow traditional patterns of development, are strongly represented 
(note the presence of the third paradoxical feature). The fourth paradoxical feature, related to 
policy instruments, could also play out rather differently in the area of adaptation, which 
comprises a much more local set of issues that are unlikely to be amenable to the “one size 
fits all” regulatory approach followed for mitigation. 
At the same time as it is grappling with these internal challenges, the EU will have to 
engage with the international community across a wide array of related issues. When the 
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EU‟s climate policies were still in their infancy, the Commission had to devote more of its 
energies to engendering multi-level reinforcement. After Copenhagen, it has to find new 
ways to confront the second paradoxical feature (actorness-diversity), in order to foster more 
developing country support. Developing countries have made it abundantly clear since 
Copenhagen that they will only accept limitations on their emissions and systems of 
monitoring and verification if richer countries provide new and additional sources of finance. 
It is by no means clear where all this money will come from, particularly when the Eurozone 
is experiencing its worst ever recession and the richer states (namely Germany) are very 
reluctant to open up the vexed issue of internal financial burden sharing (thus extending the 
third paradoxical feature). Although the US administration‟s struggles to upgrade its 
domestic climate governance system could open up a leadership opportunity for the EU to 
exploit, it may just as easily be seized by rapidly emerging economies like China, Brazil and 
India, who seem to prefer a more open “pledge and review” type approach. In order to realize 
its leadership ambitions the EU may be forced to return again and again to the second 
paradoxical feature―the combination of external actorness and internal diversity―until, 
perhaps, the Commission is made the sole negotiator, as it is in international trade 
negotiations. 
 
Longer Term Challenges 
In addition, there are challenges not just of a longer term but possibly also more existential 
nature. At present, EU policy is very heavily focused on mitigation, powerfully expressed by 
its almost totemic 2 °C target. After 2000, the nexus between mitigation and energy security 
emerged as a powerful facilitator of multi-level reinforcement, culminating in the climate and 
energy package. By contrast, the Member States‟ adaptation policies are still relatively 
inchoate and, lacking an equivalent driver, the EU‟s is barely even in existence. Therefore, 
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the EU needs to decide what its mid- to long-term focus is going to be. From a scientific 
perspective, the advice is by no means clear. The 2°C target is not only seen as being more 
difficult to achieve, especially after the Copenhagen conference,
83
 but also increasingly as 
insufficient to fulfill the UNFCCC‟s ultimate objective―that of preventing “dangerous” 
climate change.
84
 Were it to be attempted, accelerated mitigation ambitions would also likely 
run up against the fifth paradoxical feature―constrained implementation. In this situation, 
calls have grown for policies that not only aim to mitigate for at least 2 °C but also enable 
adaptation to potentially much greater rates of warming such as 3 or 4 degrees.
85
 
The intense scientific debates around these issues have not yet led to similarly intense 
discussions of the implications for governance. The implications of shifting the emphasis 
from mitigation to adaptation are potentially very challenging because the 2 °C target has: 
provided a framing of the problem that diverse leaders have found acceptable (a means of 
handling the first paradox); provided the EU with an important „identity‟ in global 
negotiations (related to the second paradox); and has implicitly been regarded as broadly 
achievable with the existing forms of burden sharing (paradox three).  Significantly, it has 
also provided a signal to investors (and third countries) that the EU is strongly committed to 
mitigation. But preparing for a world that is more than 2°C warmer is likely to require a 
much greater focus on adaptation, not just in Europe but internationally. In turn, this will 
alter the way in which the paradoxical features appear. For example, which actors will lead 
the EU in such a world (the first paradoxical feature)? Vulnerable regions and sectors within 
and outside Europe will almost inevitably demand financial transfers to cope with the 
predicted impacts, raising the issue of adaptation burden sharing (i.e. a profound change in 
the third paradoxical feature). Moreover, producing stronger adaptation policies which do not 
undermine those addressing mitigation is unlikely to be straightforward either, requiring not 
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simply policy innovation but something more difficult still―multi-level policy 
coordination.
86
 In principle it should be possible to promote synergies―or at least avoid 
conflicts―between mitigation and adaptation policies.87 But if the stalled adoption of the 
soils Directive is anything to go by, these may be more difficult to secure agreement on than 
when climate policy was much more mitigation focused. 
This takes us to the second existential challenge, which is how to ensure that the EU 
itself remains democratically robust enough to address any changes in the paradoxical 
features. In recent years, the EU‟s mitigation policies benefitted as much as other policy 
areas from the permissive social consensus in favour of deeper European integration. In a 
political world short of “Europe-wide policy discourses,”88 climate change presented the EU 
with a golden opportunity to demonstrate its political relevance by generating more and more 
policy outputs. As has so often been the case, politicians relied strongly on generating policy 
outputs to secure the EU‟s legitimacy, and rather neglected the input side of politics: public 
participation, deliberation and open contestation. It is striking that many of the key decisions 
on issues like burden sharing and standards for traded products were made in highly 
technocratic fora such as the EU‟s labyrinthine comitology committees. However, the 
permissive consensus has been badly dented in recent years by a series of referendum 
defeats, declining turnouts in European elections and the rise of anti-EU parties in various 
Member States. This has turned it into something different―a “constraining dissensus.”89 
Where this leaves EU climate policy is far from clear. As the impacts of climate 
change become more pronounced and the financial cost of mitigation and adaptation stack 
up, the politics of governing show every sign of becoming more, not less difficult: the old 
canards (produce more policy by engaging in “multi-level reinforcement”) no longer seem as 
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uniformly relevant. If, for example, the EU moves from 20% to a 30% target and then, as 
envisaged, onto something like an 80% reduction by 2050, will European citizens really be as 
ready to accept “Brussels” intruding into their everyday choices? Will national politicians be 
as willing to pool parliamentary sovereignty on such a strategically important issue in the 
EU? Either way, national governments may find that they have to work a lot harder to carry 
their publics along with them. 
 
Conclusions 
EU climate policy has emerged as an important focus of research amongst EU scholars as 
well as those seeking to understand climate governance. Although the early literature took a 
holistic approach, many of the more recent contributions have adopted a more disaggregated 
focus. We are indebted to Schreurs and Tiberghien for trying to arrange these snapshots into 
a broader picture. Their concept of “multi-level reinforcement” does help to make sense of 
the whole. However, their analysis suffers from some important shortcomings. First of all, it 
relies on a picture of EU policy that is empirically incomplete (i.e. missing the period prior to 
the 1990s). As a consequence, it presents the development of climate policy in rather too 
linear a manner, whereas others have emphasized the slower and more circuitous nature of 
policy development, especially in the longue durée from the late 1970s through to c. 2000.
90
 
It also overlooks the lop-sided nature of EU climate policy, particularly the heavy emphasis 
on mitigation as opposed to adaptation, and fails to account for the continuing reliance on a 
small sub-set of policy instruments. Consequently, one is left wondering whether “multi-
level reinforcement” is likely to persist, or was only a feature of one particularly dynamic but 
ultimately short-lived era of governing in the EU.
91
 There is plenty of scope for fresh 
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theoretically informed work on policy innovation that compares the EU with other multi-
levelled/polycentric governance systems. 
This article has sought to maintain the same broad level focus as theirs. In doing so, a 
series of paradoxical features were identified and explored. They provide an important part of 
a wider explanation for the EU‟s behavior at the international level―the kinds of policies, 
targets and instruments it pushes for; the way it conducts itself in international negotiations; 
etc. Crucially, these will help to shape the opportunities for and the obstacles to sustained 
policy innovation (“leadership”) in the future. Key actors (principally states) will doubtless 
continue to confront the tensions that arise from the simultaneous desire for greater 
international actorness and internal diversity―the second paradoxical feature. The Lisbon 
Treaty introduced another set of institutional changes that once again confronted this 
tension,
92
 including a new diplomatic service that pools the resources of the Council and the 
Commission, but the debate is far from resolved. Either way, having a strongly coordinated 
position is important, but only if other negotiating parties are willing to engage with it. At 
Copenhagen they were not. 
Meanwhile, the EU continues to deal with the tension between its desire for policy 
harmonization and differentiated burden sharing―the third paradoxical feature. With the 
steady expansion and tightening of the EU ETS, the EU‟s governance of burden sharing is 
expected to move in a more market-oriented direction. Nonetheless, there are other looming 
challenges, namely adaptation burden sharing, which the EU has barely started to discuss, let 
alone actively confront. 
With respect to the fourth feature―the desire for ambitious targets but a constrained 
set of policy instrument choices―the EU has exploited opportunities to move beyond 
traditional regulation―the emissions trading system being a case in point. Regulatory 
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approaches have undoubtedly served the EU well in the last years, but policy theory tells us 
that they have a tendency to generate concentrated costs and diffuse benefits. Whether and 
for how long the EU can continue to rely so heavily on regulation to govern climate change, 
remains a very moot point. 
Finally, until now, the EU has confronted the tension between high policy ambition 
and constrained implementation mechanisms―the fifth paradoxical feature―very indirectly 
by relying heavily on non-policy effects. In time, it may be forced to confront it more 
directly, for example by building in stronger implementation powers to ensure the policy 
innovations deliver the outcomes expected of them. 
To conclude, Schreurs and Tiberghien have successfully demonstrated that there is a 
lot to be gained by investigating EU climate governance in broad terms. If there is one thing 
that such a perspective reveals, it is how much reliance has been placed on tweaking the 
existing governance system in order to exploit the more positive aspects of its paradoxical 
features. Time after time, more radical changes proved rather unnecessary, because some of 
the features enabled as well as constrained multi-level reinforcement. Should we therefore 
declare EU‟s approach to governing a success? In terms of setting ambitious targets and 
adopting common policies and measures, the answer is probably yes. But if we examine 
policy outcomes―i.e. what governance has actually delivered in terms of emissions reduced 
and adaptations secured―the overall verdict has to be less positive, although the 
counterfactual can never be fully known.
93
 If governing is really about the active steering of 
society, then the most charitable thing that can be deduced is that the EU has successfully 
established a highly sophisticated governance framework, whose effectiveness has not yet 
been systematically tested. 
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